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This article analyzes the rise, fall, and ultimate termination of the 
largest (by volume) proposed vessel-sharing alliance the shipping 
industry has ever seen, the P3 Network Sharing Agreement. Pertinent to 
the discussion is detailed evaluation of the world’s fundamental 
regulators of liner shipping conferences, their relative power and 
authority, and how they have adapted to the world shipping market. The 
conclusion is simple: consistent with its status as the world’s largest 
shipping market and holder of state-owned carriers, China is the last 
world watchdog with the regulatory clout to prevent the formation of 
potentially anti-competitive shipping alliances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hello, Engine; I’m Jake Holman.1 
The timeless words of Steve McQueen in The Sand Pebbles resonate 
when considering the changes vessels and China have undergone in the 
last century. Jake Holman represents the old guard, a gruff engineer 
aboard a 1926 naval vessel in revolutionary China.2 Today, vessels with 
18,000 TEU3 capacities roam the oceans, and China represents the 
world’s largest export market by volume.4 
  
 * Associate, Clyde & Co US LLP, Newport Beach, California.  LL.M. in 
Admiralty, 2015, Tulane University Law School; J.D., 2014, California Western School 
of Law; B.A., History 2010, The Johns Hopkins University.  Member of the State Bar of 
California.  I am indebted to the many individuals who contributed to the publication of 
this comment.  I would like to thank Chairman Richard A. Lidinsky, Jr. for his continued 
mentorship.  I am also indebted to Alexandra and my family for their continued support, 
personally and professionally. 
 1. THE SAND PEBBLES (20th Century Fox 1966). 
 2. Id. 
 3. “The standard measurement of containerized cargo. One TEU generally 
represents a single container measuring 20 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8.5 feet high.” 
Glossary, FED. MAR. COMM’N,  
http://www.fmc.gov/questions/glossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 4. Export Volume, WORLD BANK,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.QTY.MRCH.XD.WD (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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Liner shipping conferences and vessel-sharing agreements present a 
bit of a conundrum to most. They permit ocean carriers, shrouded in anti-
trust immunity, to legally confer on rates and engage in the sharing of 
vessels across global shipping markets.5 Three main authorities oversee 
the approval and monitoring of such agreements including the United 
States’ Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC” or “Commission”), the 
European Union’s European Commission (“EC”) and China’s Ministry 
of Commerce (“MOFCOM”).6 
Consistent with increases in vessel size and the general flattening of 
freight rates came one of the largest vessel-sharing agreements the 
maritime world has seen, representing almost fifty percent of the market 
share in some routes and referred to as the P3 Network Vessel-Sharing 
Agreement (“the P3 Agreement” or “the Agreement”).7 The P3 
Agreement was filed with MOFCOM in September 2013 and with the 
FMC in October 2013, embodying a global vessel-sharing alliance 
between three of the world’s largest ocean carriers, including Denmark’s 
Maersk Line, France’s CMA CGM, and Switzerland’s Mediterranean 
Shipping Co. (“MSC”) (“the Parties”).8 The P3 Agreement was approved 
by the FMC in March 2014, denied by MOFCOM in June 2014, and 
subsequently terminated by the Parties in September 2014.9 
This article will assess the (1) rise, fall, and termination of the P3 
Agreement; (2) the current state of liner conference regulation and 
vessel-sharing agreement regulation; (3) and their future in the world’s 
most important maritime market, China. Part I will evaluate the 
regulatory authorities of the U.S., the EU, and China, their relative 
power, and market application. Part II will consider the P3 Agreement, 
its treatment by the relevant regulators and why it ultimately failed in 
  
 5. See, e.g., Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-258, 112 
Stat. 1902 (1998). 
 6. See infra Part I regarding discussion on the relevant regulatory authorities of 
the world’s shipping governments. 
 7. See infra Part II for further discussion on the P3 Agreement and its unique 
particularities as a vessel-sharing alliance. 
 8. Costas Paris, P3 Shipping Pact Is Set for U.S. Clearance; Regulator Likely to 
Attach Conditions to Its Approval, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2014,  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303874504579376811119894356. 
 9. P3 Network Vessel Sharing Agreement, FED. MAR. COMM’N,  
http://www.fmc.gov/news/p3_network_vessel_sharing_agreement.aspx (last visited Mar. 
7, 2015) [hereinafter P3 Sharing Agreement]. 
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China. The article will then conclude that China represents the remaining 
international regulator of liner conference agreements with the power 
and governmental authority to legitimately prevent anti-competitive 
shipping alliances from dominating the world stage. 
I. GLOBAL LINER CONFERENCE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES  
Consistent with economic prowess, international shipping and 
controlled carrier interests, and import and export volume, the three 
primary regulators of shipping conference and vessel- sharing 
agreements worldwide include the FMC, the EC, and MOFCOM. The 
members of the proposed P3 Agreement, therefore, sought the approval 
of these three regulatory watchdogs, for the inability to operate in any 
one of these regulated markets would make the utility of a vessel-sharing 
agreement senseless. 
A. The Federal Maritime Commission 
The FMC was created on August 12, 1961 during “the early months 
of the Kennedy Administration.”10 The FMC that exists today, however, 
has experienced considerable change over the past century including its 
name, statutory mandate, status as an independent regulatory agency, and 
general operation.11 Generally, the FMC has undergone the following 
changes since its inception: In 1916, the United States Shipping Board 
was created by Congress (“USSB”);12 and from 1936 to 1950, the FMC 
was known as the United States Maritime Commission (“USMC”).13 
Following the USMC, “the regulatory programs of the [USMC] were 
transferred to the Federal Maritime Board at the Department of 
Commerce, where they resided until the [creation of the FMC] in 
1961.”14 
  
 10. History, FED. MAR. COMM’N, http://www.fmc.gov/about/history.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 11. Id. 
 12. FED. MAR. COMM’N, STUDY OF U.S. CONTAINERIZED CARGO MOVING 
THROUGH CANADIAN AND MEXICAN SEAPORTS 30 (2012), available at  
http://www.fmc.gov/assets/1/news/study_of_us_inland_containerized_cargo_moving_thr
ough_canadian_and_mexican_seaports_final.pdf. 
 13. Id.  
 14. See History, supra note 10. 
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1.  FMC Origin, History, and Predecessor Agencies 
The FMC’s origin reaches back to the global issues surrounding 
World War I (“WWI”). In 1914 WWI had created a vessel shortage for 
shipping goods, resulting from the considerable amount of vessel-usage 
for the war effort.15 As the U.S.’s export needs grew, and space on 
vessels became sparse, it became clear a “new maritime watchdog 
agency”16 was needed to protect American interests at home and abroad. 
Grounded in war-based concerns and on The Alexander Committee 
Investigation, 1912-1914, Congress found that shipping conferences that 
were given anti-trust immunity by the U.S. government would be the 
best way to serve the needs of U.S. exporters.17 With anti-trust immunity, 
however, came great concern that such a privilege would be taken 
advantage of, and the USSB, created under the Shipping Act of 191618 
(“the Act” or “the Shipping Act”) was mandated to “protect American 
exporters and importers from any potential abuse of the anti-trust 
immunity Congress would grant conferences under new shipping 
legislation.”19 The Merchant Marine Act20 was created in 1920 and 
“charged the [USSB] with monitoring and responding to foreign laws, 
regulations, or practices that create conditions unfavorable to shipping in 
. . . foreign trade.”21  
Subsequently, in 1936 Congress shifted the USSB to the Commerce 
Department, and created the USMC.22 In 1950 the regulatory duties of 
the USMC were transferred to the FMB within the Commerce 
Department, which continued to regulate maritime trade until the FMC 
was given its congressional mandate in 1961.23 
  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. The Shipping Act of 1916 is “the organic act of all maritime commercial 
statutes.” Id. See generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 40101-41309 (2012) (the Shipping Act’s current 
codification). 
 19. See History, supra note 10. 
 20. See 46 U.S.C. § 50101 (2012). 
 21. See History, supra note 10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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2.    Creation of the FMC, Statutory Mandates, and 
Regulatory Power 
In the early months of 1961, President Kennedy and Congress 
“decided that the tasks of regulating the activities of international liner 
shipping companies and promoting a healthy U.S. merchant marine 
should be pursued by separate agencies.”24 Reorganization Plan No. 7, an 
executive order at the direction of President Kennedy, created two 
agencies: The FMC and the Maritime Administration (“MARAD”).25 
The FMC was established as an independent regulatory agency, charged 
with regulating U.S. ocean commerce, where MARAD (part of the 
Department of Transportation) would promote maritime commerce as 
well as oversee the merchant marine and an “emergency reserve of cargo 
ships for use in times of conflict.”26 
In the 1950’s, lured by lower rates and labor costs, freight-
forwarders27 began consolidating shipments and employing the use of 
U.S. railroads to carry truck trailers over long distances.28 The age of 
containerization began in April 1956 when an aging tanker known as the 
Ideal X, loaded with fifty-eight “aluminum bodies” sailed from Newark, 
New Jersey to Houston, Texas.29 In Houston, fifty-eight trucks were 
ready and waiting for the “aluminum bodies” that would come to be 
known as containers, and “such was the beginning of a revolution.”30  
The 1956 onset of containerization was a major factor in compelling 
the Kennedy Administration to restructure the authorities tasked with 
regulating international maritime commerce.31 Containerization created a 
significantly more dynamic logistics market, changing what had been a 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. A freight forwarder is “[a] person whose business is to act as an agent on 
behalf of the shipper to arrange transportation services. A freight forwarder frequently 
makes the booking reservation.” See Glossary, supra note 3. 
 28. Gisela Rua, Fixed Costs, Network Effects, and the International Diffusion of 
Containerization, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 7 (2012) (citing MARC 
LEVINSON, THE BOX: HOW THE SHIPPING CONTAINER MADE THE WORLD SMALLER AND 
THE WORLD ECONOMY BIGGER 150-59 (2006)). 
 29. LEVINSON, supra note 28, at 1. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See History, supra note 10. 
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relatively stable industry.32 A new kind of maritime commerce meant a 
new regulatory agency “to take the lead in updating the nation’s 
transportation regulations to remove obstacles to the intermodal services 
that [would] bec[ome] so critical to [the] nation’s commerce.”33 
3. The Shipping Act (1916 and 1984) 
The FMC’s regulatory powers are vested in the primary statute that 
governs ocean-shipping practices, the Shipping Act.34 Congress enacted 
the Shipping Act of 1916 (“1916 Act”) in response to the events 
surrounding WWI and, in reaction to changes in maritime commerce, has 
amended it several times.35 Thirty years after containerization 
revolutionized global trade “shippers and carriers recognized that the 
pre-container Shipping Act of 1916 needed modernization.”36 On March 
20, 1984, the Shipping Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”) was passed and with it 
came “regulatory innovations that have had a major impact on liner 
shipping and the FMC’s responsibilities.”37  
The important amendments of the 1916 Act included the introduction 
of negotiated service contracts for liner services, expelling the archaic 
process of exclusively providing public tariffs.38 Additionally, the “1984 
Act also clarified the authority of conference members to offer 
intermodal pricing.”39 This allowed shippers to now contract with an 
ocean carrier for an entire “door-to-door” rate including both the ocean 
and intermodal rates (either truck or rail). Additionally, the 1984 Act 
expedited the approval process for entities wishing to enter into 
cooperative agreements, known as conferences.40 Under the 1984 Act, 
such cooperative agreements become active after forty-five days, in the 
absence of FMC intervention.41  
  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 46 U.S.C. §§ 40101-41309 (2012). 
 35. Christopher T. Cook, Funding Port-Related Infrastructure and Development: 
The Current Debate and Proposed Reform, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1523, 1538 (2011). 
 36. See History, supra note 10. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 46 U.S.C. § 40304 (2012). 
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Today, the Shipping Act serves four main purposes: 
1) establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory process for the common 
carriage of goods by water in the foreign commerce of the United 
States with a minimum of government intervention and regulatory 
costs; 
2) provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the ocean 
commerce of the United States that is, insofar as possible, in harmony 
with, and responsive to, international shipping practices; 
3) encourage the development of an economically sound and efficient 
liner fleet of vessels of the United States capable of meeting national 
security needs; and 
4) promote the growth and development of United States exports 
through competitive and efficient ocean transportation and by placing 
greater reliance on the marketplace.42 
In general, “The [FMC] has jurisdiction to regulate ocean shipping 
lines operating between the United States and foreign countries, monitor 
agreements between ocean common carriers, and enforce a number of 
prohibitions against discriminatory and unreasonable rates and 
practices.”43 The main actors that fall under its regulation are “ocean 
carriers, ports, and marine terminal operators (‘MTO[s]’).”44  
4. Deregulation: The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 
Section 18 of the 1984 Act required that the Commission “conduct a 
5-year study on how the Act’s reforms actually worked out in practice.”45 
Review of the study took place from 1991 to 1992, the recommendation 
of which constituted the major deregulation legislation following the 
1984 amendments in the form of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 
  
 42. Cook, supra note 35, at n.92 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 40101). 
 43. 80 C.J.S. SHIPPING § 256 n.1 (citing Regal-Beloit Corp. v. Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd., 557 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 44. Cook, supra note 35, at 1537-38 nn.91-95 (citing §§ 40101-44106). 
 45. See History, supra note 10. 
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199846 (“OSSRA”).47 After Congressional approval, President Clinton 
signed OSSRA into law on October 14, 1998; it took effect on May 1, 
1999.48 The main purposes of the deregulatory reform were to provide 
more flexibility to the shipping industry and to allow the liner trade to 
rely more heavily on the marketplace.49 The main reforms that OSSRA 
included were: 
1) ending the authority for liner conferences to regulate their 
members’ service contracts[;] 
2) encouraging confidentiality of rates in contracts[;] 
3) giving the Commission enhanced authority to provide exemptions 
from existing statutory provisions[; and] 
4) strengthening the FMC’s authority to address restrictive practices 
by foreign governments and state-controlled carriers.50 
Today the shippers, carriers, ports, MTO’s, freight-forwarders, and 
logistics experts that make up the maritime shipping industry operate 
with more ease and flexibility than ever before, allowing for the highest 
levels of commercial efficiency the industry has seen since the inception 
of containerization. 
5. Conference and Vessel-Sharing Agreements under the 
Shipping Act 
 
 a. Approval Process  
The conference agreement process is fairly straightforward, despite 
the powerful anti-trust immunity vested with the FMC. Under the 
Shipping Act a conference agreement must be filed with the FMC stating 
the general purpose of the agreement, “provide reasonable and equal 
  
 46. Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-258, 112 Stat. 1902 
(1998). 
 47. See History, supra note 10. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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terms for admission and readmission to conference membership for any 
ocean common carrier willing to serve the particular trade or route” and 
stipulate to other enumerated requirements.51  
After preliminary evaluation, the Commission must reject an 
agreement if it does not comply with the mandated Shipping Act 
perquisites.52 If the Commission fails to reject the proffered agreement 
within forty-five days of filing, the agreement will become effective.53 
The filing parties may request a shortened period, “but not to a date that 
is less than [fourteen] days after notice of the filing of the agreement is 
published in the Federal Register.”54 The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia possesses sole discretion as to a Commission 
requested extension of the forty-five day period, through the civil action 
procedures provided by section 41307 of title 46.55  In practice, the five 
  
 51. 46 U.S.C. § 40303(b)(1)-(2) (2012). The agreement must:  
(3) permit any member to withdraw from conference membership on 
reasonable notice without penalty;  
(4) at the request of any member, require an independent neutral body to 
police fully the obligations of the conference and its members . . .  
(6) provide for a consultation process designed to promote—(A) 
commercial resolution of disputes; and (B) cooperation with shippers in 
preventing and eliminating malpractices;  
(7) establish procedures for promptly and fairly considering requests and 
complaints of shippers;  
(8) and provide that—(A) any member of the conference may take 
independent action on a rate or service item on not more than 5 days’ 
notice to the conference; and (B) except for an exempt commodity not 
published in the conference tariff, the conference will include the new 
rate or service item in its tariff for use by that member, effective no later 
than 5 days after the receipt of the notice, and by any other member that 
notifies the conference that it elects to adopt the independent rate or 
service item on or after its effective date, in lieu of the existing 
conference tariff provision for that rate or service item.  
Id. § 40303(b)(3)-(4), (6)-(8). 
 52. Id. § 40304. 
 53. Id. § 40304(c)(1).  
 54. Id. § 40304(e)(1). 
 55. Id. § 40304(e)(2). Such an action would be brought by the Commission’s 
Office of General Counsel. This is in contrast to the majority of federal agencies that 
statutorily delegate litigation to the Attorney General. See id. § 41307(d). The general 
duty of the Office of General Council (OGC) is to provide legal services to the 
Commission and Commission staff. Office of the General Counsel, FED. MAR. COMM’N, 
http://www.fmc.gov/bureaus_offices/general_counsel.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
OGC provides advice to the Commissioners, Chairman, and Commission in general on 
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senate-confirmed Commissioners that lead the FMC will often vote as to 
the efficacy of Commission action to block a proposed agreement.56 The 
contemporary essence of the Shipping Act, therefore, embodies a 
statutory framework allowing a relaxed approval process for conference 
agreements, with the burden on the Commission in denying 
endorsement.  
Many conference agreements will inherently involve a vessel sharing 
agreement, which are also permitted under the Shipping Act. Under the 
Act, “[a]n ocean common carrier that is the owner, operator, or bareboat 
[charterer], time, or slot charterer of a liner vessel . . . may agree with an 
ocean common carrier . . . to which it charters or subcharters the 
vessel.”57 This is provided, however, that the carrier is not a U.S.-flagged 
vessel involved in the Maritime Security Fleet Program.58  
 b. Legal Regulation   
Statutorily, the Commission “may bring a civil action to enjoin 
conduct [for general violations] . . . . [And such] action must be brought 
in the district court of the United States for any judicial district in which 
the defendant resides or transacts business.”59 The primary reason for 
Commission action, however, is a reduction in competition resulting 
from an approved agreement.60 Substantively, the Commission may take 
action to enjoin members of an agreement from further operation if it 
“determines that the agreement is likely, by a reduction in competition, 
  
“adjudicatory and investigatory proceedings.” Id. Additionally, OGC drafts all 
rulemakings involving the FMC, issues formal opinions on behalf of the Commission 
when reviewing an ALJ’s initial decision, and defends the Commission when its 
decisions are reviewed by a federal appellate court. Id.  
 56. This is how the Commission determined whether to take action regarding the 
P3 agreement. See infra Part II regarding the FMC’s analysis of the legality of the P3 
Agreement. The Commission is comprised of five Commissioners, appointed by the 
President, “with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1). No more 
than three Commissioners may be from the same political party, and the President must 
designate one of them to be Chairman, who will act as the chief executive and 
administrative officer of the Commission. Id. § 301(c)(1)-(2). The Commission needs 
only three Commissioners to function, as a quorum is based on a majority vote. Id. § 302. 
 57. 46 U.S.C. § 40303(d)(1). 
 58. Id. § 40303(d)(2). 
 59. Id. § 41307(a). 
 60. See id. § 41307(b)(1). 
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to produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an 
unreasonable increase in transportation cost.”61 Unlike an action for a 
general violation, an action brought for a reduction in competition falls 
under the exclusive purview of the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, with the burden on the Commission.62 This constitutes the 
FMC’s sole remedy with regard to an action for a reduction in 
competition.63 
 c. Economic Regulation 
The Commission’s decision to take legal action for a reduction in 
competition is usually grounded in the FMC’s economic monitoring 
programs run by the Bureau of Trade Analysis (“BTA”) and within that 
Bureau, the Office of Economics and Competition Analysis. The general 
mandate of BTA is to review agreements and monitor the concerted 
activities of common carriers.64 Additionally, BTA “also is responsible 
for competition oversight and market analysis, focusing on activity that 
is substantially anti-competitive under the standards of . . . the Shipping 
Act.”65 In essence, BTA is an expert organization regarding “the 
economics of international liner shipping . . . especially with respect to 
issues of competition and unfair trade practices as they may affect the 
interests of the shipping public and U.S. international trade.”66 
The Office of Economics and Competition Analysis reports directly to 
BTA as well as to the Commissioners, and is tasked with keeping the 
Commission apprised of industry trends based in part on approved 
agreements.67 The Office does go through the preparation of “studies and 
  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. § 41307(b)(3). 
 63. Id. The court may issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, 
or a permanent injunction. Id. § 41307(2). Interestingly, the court may not allow third-
party intervention. Id. § 41307(3). 
 64. Bureau of Trade Analysis, FED. MAR. COMM’N,  
http://www.fmc.gov/bureaus_offices/bureau_of_trade_analysis.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 
2015). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Office of Economics and Competition Analysis, FED. MAR. COMM’N,  
http://www.fmc.gov/bureaus_offices/office_of_economics_and_competition_analysis.asp
x (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). 
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profiles of major trades, using monitoring reports, economic analyses, 
and agreement/carrier profiles.”68 Ongoing surveillance programs to 
ensure carrier compliance with the statutory mandates for approved 
conference agreements and the development of “profiles of major trade 
areas to assess carrier behavior under agreements” make up the balance 
of the Office’s duties.69 
B. The European Commission  
1. The EU Generally  
The EU involves unique particularities as a regulator of vessel-sharing 
and conference agreements because it is not a nation, but a membership 
of nations; “[i]ts twenty-eight Member States have surrendered elements 
of their sovereignty to the EU in return for such phenomena as an 
internal market, a social union, and economic and monetary union, and ‘a 
new legal order.’”70 This integrated network was spawned from the 
fragmented economic communities of Europe in the 1950s, including the 
European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”), the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”), and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(“EAEC”).71  
The European Commission represents the interests of the EU through 
the drafting of proposals for European laws, implementing EU policies, 
and spending EU funds.72 It should also be noted that although EU law 
operates in parallel fashion to Member State law, EU law prevails where 
the two are in conflict.73 The EU Commission is composed of twenty-
eight Commissioners, one from each EU country; the EU Commission 
  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Vincent J.G. Power, The Historical Evolution of European Union Shipping 
Law, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311, 362 (2014) (citing Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transp. v. 
Nederlandse adminstratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12.). 
 71. Id. 
 72. European Commission, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 73. Power, supra note 70, at 314 (citing Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 
1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.). 
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here may refer to the permanent staff, the Commissioners, or the 
institution as a whole.74 
2. EU Liner Conference and Competition Law   
In 1979, Regulation 954/79 was adopted pertaining to the EU 
Commission’s stance on liner conferences.75 This regulation essentially 
adopted the United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner 
Conferences (“UNCTAD”).76 The EU Commission’s explanation of 
Regulation 954/79 stated in pertinent part that: 
Regulation 954/79 . . . acknowledged the stabilizing role of liner 
conferences, guaranteeing regular and reliable services to transport 
users . . . . Th[is] Commission is concerned about the increasing trend 
to exclude outside competition from trades in which closed conferences 
operate. These cases are most serious when a State at one end of the 
trade route precludes non-conference competition. Th[is] 
Commission’s proposal is designed in particular to deal with this 
problem.77 
In an additional proposal, to ensure EU liners’ marketplace 
competiveness, it reserved the right to “act against unfair practices where 
[non-EU shipping companies] cause or threaten material injury to EU 
liner conferences.”78 
In 1986, amid a prospering global economy, Regulation 4056/86 
established a block exemption for liner conferences.79 In 2008, however, 
“by virtue of Regulation 1419/2006, the block exemption for liner 
conferences in Regulation 4056/86 ended.”80 EU competition law 
therefore applies in full to the European shipping sector, meaning “liner 
conferences, which have as their object or effect the fixing of prices (that 
is tariffs) or conditions of competition to and from the EU, which are 
  
 74. Composition, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/european-commission/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
 75. See Council Regulation 954/79, 1979 I.J. (L 121) 1. 
 76. Power, supra note 70, at 332. 
 77. Council Regulation 954/79, 1979 I.J. (L 121) 8. 
 78. Power, supra note 70, at 333.  
 79. Council Regulation 4056/86, 1986 O.J. (L 378) 4. 
 80. Power, supra note 70, at 352. 
2015] Watchdogs of the World 93 
now prohibited.”81 The exchanging of information between carriers could 
therefore constitute a breach of EU competition law.82 
3. The Lingering Compromise: Consortia 
 
 a. Block Exemption Regulations 
In 1992, Regulation 479/9283 established a block exemption to 
consortia, which are essentially vessel-sharing agreements, and have 
unsurprisingly always been favored by the EU Commission because they 
do not lean on the practice of price-fixing.84 To that end, “[c]onsortia are 
clearly more attractive to competition agencies than liner conferences 
because consortia often provide shipping services in an efficient manner 
that meets consumer needs.”85  
But, because consortia are not inherently devoid of anticompetitive 
concepts, a block exemption was still necessary to ensure legal 
compliance with EU competition law.86 This came in the form of a 
consortia block exemption, chiefly Regulation 823/2000.87 This 
regulation was subsequently replaced with Regulation 906/200988 as the 
block exemption was due to expire in April 2010.89 This exemption is 
effective through April 2015, as the block exemptions have perennially 
been adopted in a series of five-period installments.90  
  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Council Regulation 479/92, 1992 O.J. (L 196) 3. 
 84. Power, supra note 70, at 342. 
 85. Id. at 354. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Commission Regulation 906/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 256) 31. 
 89. Power, supra note 70, at 354. 
 90. Views on Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009, WORLD SHIPPING 
COUNCIL 3 (June 2013),  
http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/Submissions/EU/wsc-ecsa-ics-views-on-
commission-regulation-(ec)-no-906-2009.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
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 b. Definitional Scope, Conditions, and Rationale 
Under EU Commission regulations, consortia enable carriers to enter 
into agreements that enjoy block exemption from Community 
competition rules so long as such agreements do not eliminate 
competition.91 By definition, consortia are cooperative agreements 
between companies to jointly operate a maritime transportation service; 
“[t]he members of such consortia provide regular international liner 
shipping services for goods only, generally using containers, in one or 
more trades.”92 The scope of EU consortia regulations applies to 
international maritime carrier services from or to one or more EU 
member ports.93  
Eligibility for consortia block exemptions is based on economic anti-
monopoly theory, with the main criterion being continued and effective 
competition in the market.94 Quantitatively, EU regulations state that a 
“consortium must, in order to benefit from the exemption, possess on 
each market in which it operates a market share of under 30% calculated 
by reference to the volume of goods carried when it operates within a 
conference, or under 35% when it operates outside a conference.”95 
Independence is also a main factor in exempted status and has 
substantive criteria in the regulations, as consortia members must retain 
the ability to offer autonomous arrangements and services, withdrawal 
rights without financial consequences, and the ability to engage in 
independent marketing.96 The responsibilities of consortia members are 
not onerous, as agreements are automatically exempted without even as 
  
 91. Exemption for Certain Agreements Between Liner Shipping Companies 
(“Consortia“), EUR-LEX,  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l26095_en.htm, (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter Exemption for Certain Agreements]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (“More specifically, the activities covered are as follows: the joint 
operation of maritime transport services; temporary capacity adjustments; the joint 
operation or use of port terminals; participation in one or more of the following pools: 
cargo, revenue or net revenue; the exercise of voting rights held by the consortium in the 
conference within which its members operate; a joint marketing structure and/or the issue 
of a joint bill of lading.”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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much as a written proposal; members are obliged only to “demonstrate to 
the [EU] Commission that they consult their users on important matters 
and that the conditions of their maritime transport[ation] services are 
made available to users at reasonable cost[s].”97 
The relaxed approval process for vessel sharing agreements could be 
couched in the EU Commission’s overarching belief that consortia offer 
benefits to the consumer rather than exclusively promote carrier success. 
This is reflected in the Regulations, as the EU Commission stated in 
most recent block exemption, Regulation 906/2009 that consortia:  
[I]mprove the productivity and quality of available liner shipping 
services by reason of the rationalisation they bring to the activities of 
member companies and through the economies of scale they allow in 
the operation of vessels and the utilisation of port facilities. They also 
help to promote technical and economic progress by facilitating and 
encouraging greater utilisation of containers and more efficient vessel 
capacity.98 
In essence, because the regulations mandate that the economic 
byproducts of increased productivity trickle down to the 
consumer/shipper, rather than benefit member carriers through 
uncompetitive rates, consortia as a whole are positively viewed by EU 
lawmakers. 
C. China 
As the world-leader in export volume,99 China’s approval or barring 
of a liner conference or vessel-sharing agreement makes a proposal 
worthwhile, or completely fruitless. Chinese anti-trust law as it relates to 
liner agreements in the maritime context parallels Chinese norms 
regarding rigid state control, absence of positive free-market economic 
theory, and nebulous legal transparency.100 The law that is accessible is 
accommodatingly broad, so that Chinese regulators may conveniently 
employ the same statutory provision oppositely, in justifying a pre-
  
 97. Id. 
 98. Commission Regulation 906/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 256) 31, 32. 
 99. Export Volume, supra note 4. 
 100. See discussion infra Parts I.C.1-2. 
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determined conclusion based on extraneous factors.101 This section will 
evaluate the Chinese approval process taking into account the unique 
considerations that accompany any legal or business endeavor in China. 
1.    Regulations of China on International Maritime 
Transportation 
The applicable law concerning liner conference and vessel sharing 
agreements is embodied not in the Chinese Maritime Code, but in the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Maritime 
Transportation (“Transportation Regulations”).102The Transportation 
Regulations were “[a]dopted at the [forty-ninth] Executive Meeting of 
the State Council on December 5, 2001, promulgated by Decree No. 335 
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on December 11, 
2001, and [became] effective as of January 1, 2002.”103  
 a. Scope and General Applicability  
Where the Chinese Maritime Code provides substantive maritime law 
within Chinese admiralty jurisdiction, the Transportation Regulations 
include the protocols for operating within the maritime transportation 
system in a commercial sense.104 The stated purposes of the 
Transportation Regulations, therefore includes “regulating international 
maritime transportation operations, protecting fair competition, 
maintaining the order of [the] international maritime transportation 
market and safeguarding the lawful rights of the interests of the relevant 
parties involved in international maritime transportation.”105 Consistent 
with the U.S. and the EU, Chinese law regulating liner agreements 
applies to and from Chinese ports.106 The Transportation Regulations 
apply with equal force to auxiliary business operations that relate to 
  
 101. See id. 
 102. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Maritime 
Transportation (promulgated by St. Council, Dec. 5, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002) 
available at www.sse.net.cn/doc/e01.doc (China) [hereinafter Transportation 
Regulations]. 
 103. Id. at pmbl. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. art. 1. 
 106. Id. art. 2. 
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international maritime transportation.107 These “auxiliary business[es]” 
include “the businesses relating to international shipping agency 
services, international ship management, loading and unloading, storage 
and warehousing of international shipments and international maritime 
container freight station and container yard services, etc.”108 
 b. The Chinese Liner Agreement Approval Process:   
  Criteria, Requirements, and Interpretative Guidelines  
The general requirements for submitting a liner agreement proposal 
are fairly straightforward and are outlined in Article 22 of the 
Transportation Regulations. To initiate the approval process, photocopies 
of the agreement must “be filed with the competent communications 
department of the State Council within [fifteen] days from the date of 
conclusion of [the] agreement[].”109 Like other international regulators,110 
Chinese law emphasizes that agreements built on an anti-competitive 
framework will not be tolerated.111 Article 27 of the Transportation 
Regulations articulates these criteria as prohibited acts, including 
providing anti-competitively low freight-rates,112 offering shippers secret 
rebates,113 taking advantage of a dominant market position to impose 
discriminatory freight rates or other detrimental terms,114 and 
“committing any other acts detrimental to the other party of the 
transaction or the order of [the] international shipping market.”115 
  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. art. 22. 
 110. See infra Part I.A-B (regarding U.S. and EU regulators’ clearly articulated 
statutory provisions barring agreements that lean solely on anti-competitive constructs). 
 111. Transportation Regulations, supra note 102, art. 27. 
 112. Id. ¶ 1. 
 113. Id. ¶ 2. 
 114. Id. ¶ 3. 
 115. Id. ¶ 4. In theory, investigations would be carried out by the competent 
Chinese authorities based in part on investigatory powers vested in the Government in the 
Transportation Regulations. See id. art. 35 (“The competent communications department 
of the State Council may, upon the request of the interested parties or at its own 
discretion, conduct investigations into the following cases: liner conference agreements, 
operational . . . or freight rate agreements concluded among international shipping 
operators engaged in international liner services in which Chinese ports are involved and 
which can be detrimental to fair competition; service activities of the consortium set up 
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Despite the seemingly clear approval process, the primary mechanism 
employed by Chinese regulators in evaluating and ultimately barring a 
proposed liner agreement is not embodied in Article 22, but rather 
Article 24, the approval process for a merger of international shipping 
operators.116 As alluded to earlier, these interpretive guidelines are just 
that; Article 24 provides enough ambiguity to be applied in the liner 
agreement context and in any way the regulators see fit.117 In evaluating 
the efficacy of a merger, and whether to approve it, Chinese authorities 
must “tak[e] into consideration policies of the State for the development 
of [the] international shipping industry and the situation of competition 
prevailing in the international shipping market, and make a decision 
either approving or disapproving such an agreement, and shall notify the 
international shipping operators of the result in writing.”118 The breadth 
with which Article 24 was written offers the obvious advantage of liberal 
interpretation and ultimately, creative application. 
2.    Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
In addition to the Transportation Regulations, China also refers to its 
generally applicable anti-monopoly law in reviewing conference 
agreements. The Anti-monopoly law of the People’s Republic of China 
was adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th 
National People’s Congress on August 30, 2007, and came into force on 
August 1, 2008.119 Specifically, the Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM, 
  
by international shipping operators engaged in international liner services through 
agreements that involve a shipping volume exceeding 30 [percent] of the aggregate 
shipping volume for one consecutive year on one particular shipping line to and from 
Chinese ports and which can be detrimental to fair competition.”); id. art. 40 (“In case of 
detriment to fair competition, the investigatory authority may take certain prohibitive or 
restrictive measures such as ordering to amend relevant agreements, limiting the 
frequency of liner services, suspending the application of freight rates, or stopping for the 
time being the filing of freight rates, or ordering to submit relevant materials on a regular 
basis.”). 
 116. Id. arts. 22, 24. 
 117. Id. art. 24. 
 118. Id. 
 119. ୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥⍵✬㕕ἲ [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Of the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 68 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., available 
at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789. 
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looks to Article 27 for factors regarding business concentration within a 
given market.120 In evaluating the market concentration, a Chinese 
regulator must consider the following factors: 
(1) [The market share of the business operators involved in the relevant 
market and the controlling power thereof] over that market; 
(2) [t]he degree of market concentration in the relevant market, 
(3) [t]he [influence] of the concentration of business operators on the 
market access and technological [progress]; 
(4) [t]he [influence] of the concentration of business operators on the 
consumers and other business operators; 
(5) [t]he [influence] of the concentration of business operators on the 
national economic development; and 
(6)  [o]ther [elements] that may [have an e]ffect on the market 
competition and shall be [taken into account as regarded] by the Anti-
monopoly Authority under the State Council.121 
Consistent with the Transportation Regulations, the Anti-monopoly 
code includes broad and malleable language, affording Chinese 
regulators the ability to apply the law flexibly.  
MOFCOM must also abide by Article 30, which obliges it to publish 
decisions regarding the prohibition of a market concentration for 
monopolistic reasons.122 MOFCOM’s eventual statement of rejection 
regarding the P3 Agreement, Announcement No. 46 of 2014, was issued 
in part to comply with Article 30 of the Anti-monopoly code.123 
  
 120. Id. art. 27. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. art. 30. 
 123. Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Notice No. 46 of 2014 
on the Prohibition of Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM Establishing A Network Alliance (June 
17, 2014), available at  
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/e/201406/20140600628730.shtmlhttp://www.joc.co
m/maritime-news/container-lines/p3-network/full-text-mofcom’s-rejection-
p3_20140619.html (Chinese) translated at http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-
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3.     MOFCOM  
MOFCOM serves at the pleasure of the State Council, and operates on 
a multi-faceted basis “formulat[ing] the strategies, guidelines and 
policies of developing domestic and foreign trade and international 
economic cooperation, draft[ing] the laws and regulations governing 
domestic and foreign trade, foreign investment in China, foreign 
assistance, overseas investment and foreign economic cooperation, [and] 
devis[ing] relevant departmental regulations.”124 Additionally, 
MOFCOM also launches all anti-monopoly investigations, both 
preemptively and regarding organizations with operational approval.125 
MOFCOM therefore functions with incredible autonomy and authority as 
it possesses the power to create, interpret, and apply law with virtually no 
oversight.126 This is to say, that unlike the FMC and European 
Commission, for which appellate processes are available, MOFCOM is 
both the initial and final decision-maker for a proposed liner 
agreement.127 
The Anti-Monopoly Bureau (“Bureau”) functions within the 
overarching construct of MOFCOM and is tasked with a myriad of 
functions relating to anti-monopoly regulation.128 Pertinent to the 
relevant discussion, the Bureau is obligated to undergo anti-monopoly 
review of “applications of concentrations of undertakings, and take 
  
lines/p3-network/full-text-mofcom’s-rejection-p3_20140619.html [hereinafter Notice No. 
46 of 2014]. 
 124. Mission, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Dec. 7, 
2010, 10:14 AM), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  
 127. See infra Part I.A-B. (regarding FMC and EU procedures for vessel-sharing 
agreement approval). 
 128. It should be noted that while the Bureau oversees the approval of liner 
agreements, the Shanghai Shipping Exchange (“SSE”), part of the Ministry of 
Commerce, plays a vital the international shipping industry where Chinese ports are 
involved as “SSE is gifted with the basic functions . . . ‘to standardize the transaction, to 
adjust the freight rates, and to communication information on the shipping market.’” 
Brief Introduction, SHANGHAI SHIPPING EXCHANGE, http://en.sse.net.cn/brief/introen.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2015). To that end, “SSE has produced widespread social and 
economic benefits and played an important role in regulating China’s shipping market, 
maintain[] the shipping transaction order and propelling healthy development of the 
shipping market.” Id. 
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related hearings, investigation and review”129 and “[t]o take charge of 
investigation into monopoly in foreign trade and take measures in a bid 
to eliminate damage.”130 Additionally, the Bureau also holds general 
competition oversight, “organiz[ing] consultations and negotiations on 
competition clauses of multilateral and bilateral agreements.”131 Similar 
to the Transportation Regulations that it interprets and enforces, the 
functional competency of the Bureau is comprehensively vague, so that 
its oversight presumably reaches any monopolistic threat. It is also 
equally ironic that the Bureau is the ultimate decision-maker on liner 
agreement applications, as this insinuates that liner agreements are, by 
their very nature, inherently monopolistic. 
II. THE P3 NETWORK VESSEL SHARING AGREEMENT: RISE, FALL, AND 
TERMINATION 
The P3 Network Vessel Sharing Agreement was filed with MOFCOM 
on September 18, 2013,132 and subsequently with the FMC on October 
24, 2013.133 The Agreement cleared FMC regulatory review on March 
20, 2014.134 Conversely, MOFCOM denied regulatory approval on June 
17, 2014, essentially destroying any potential commercial viability the 
Agreement was aimed to achieve.135 Consistent with the consortia block 
exemption requirements, the Parties to the P3 Agreement were not 
required to file for approval with the EU Commission because the 
carriers would not collectively operate in any one market above thirty 
percent of the total container volume, and the structure of the agreement 
reflected a pure vessel-sharing agreement.136 
The stated purpose of the Agreement was “to authorize the parties to 
share vessels with one another in the Trade . . . and to authorize the 
  
 129. Functions, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, ANTI-
MONOPOLY BUREAU,  
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/departments/fldj2/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Notice No. 46 of 2014, supra note 123. 
 133. P3 Sharing Agreement, supra note 9. 
 134. P3 Agreement Clears FMC Regulatory Review, FED. MAR. COMM’N (March 
20, 2014), http://www.fmc.gov/NR14-06/. 
 135. Notice No. 46 of 2014, supra note 123. 
 136. Exemption for Certain Agreements, supra note 91. 
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parties to enter into cooperative working arrangements in connection 
therewith.”137 Importantly, therefore, the parties were proposing a vessel-
sharing agreement, and not a conference agreement including the 
collective setting of freight rates. Maersk, CMA CGM, and MSC 
constituted the three parties to the Agreement; essentially, “the [proposed 
A]greement . . . would authorize the [P]arties to share vessels and engage 
in related cooperative [arrangements] in the trades between the U.S. and 
Asia, North Europe, and the Mediterranean.”138 Substantively, the Parties 
would be “authorized to discuss and agree on the size, number and . . . 
characteristics of vessels to be operated . . . and the number of vessels 
contributed by each [p]arty.”139 At a quantitative level, this would result 
in the Parties collectively “operat[ing] approximately one hundred and 
thirty (130) vessels in the Trade, with nominal capacities ranging from 
approximately 4,000 TEUs to approximately 12,250] TEUs.”140 The 
Agreement would also authorize the parties to futuristically “operate up 
to one hundred and eighty (180) vessels in the Trade, each with a 
capacity of up 19,200 TEUs.”141 Temporally, the Agreement was to 
continue for not less than ten years; resignation of rights for any Party 
would accrue after two years.142 
Each party to the Agreement would have an individual slot capacity 
allocation with respect to each service and in each trade lane.143 The 
Agreement also allowed the Parties to discuss and agree upon terminals 
for vessel calling.144 In an attempt to presumably distinguish the 
Agreement as a vessel-sharing agreement, rather than a conference 
agreement, each Party was obligated to “retain its separate identity and . . 
. have fully separate and independent sales, pricing, and marketing 
functions.”145 In reiterating this distinction, and to quell the inevitable 
Chinese scrutiny of a perceived merger, the Agreement goes on to state 
  
 137. P3 Network Vessel Sharing Agreement, No. 012230, Fr.-Den.-Switz., art. 2, 
Oct. 24, 2013, available at http://www2.fmc.gov/agreement_lib/012230-000-P.pdf 
[hereinafter P3 Sharing Agreement, No. 012230]. 
 138. P3 Agreement Clears FMC Regulatory Review, supra note 134. 
 139. P3 Sharing Agreement, No. 012230, supra note 137, art 5(5.1)(a). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. art. 8(8.1). 
 143. Id. art. 5(5.2). 
 144. Id. art. 5(5.4). 
 145. Id. art. 5(5.6)(a). 
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that “[t]his Agreement does not create and shall not be construed as 
creating any legal entity . . . or joint liability under the law of any 
jurisdiction.”146  
What proved to be a contentious, and somewhat contrary, stipulation 
of the Agreement was the authorization to “form, own, utilize, and 
dissolve a legal entity to act as a network cent[er] . . . for the purposes of 
the joint coordination and management of the P3 network.”147 The 
Network Center was therefore tasked with implementing the conditions 
stated in the corporate documents and to oversee the maintenance of the 
vessel schedules.148 In addition to the network center, two standing 
committees were also to be formed as a condition of the Agreement.149 
These would include a management committee and an audit and 
compliance committee.150 To an unbiased observer, these committees 
could be perceived as managerial boards, much like a corporation’s 
board of directors. 
A. Analysis of Regulatory Review 
1.    FMC Review 
The FMC undertook extensive review in approving the Agreement, 
which per FMC mandate, became effective on March 24, 2014.151 The 
Commission’s decision, from which Commissioner Lidinsky dissented, 
was “based on a determination that the agreement is not likely at this 
time, by a reduction in competition, to produce an unreasonable increase 
in transportation cost or an unreasonable reduction in transportation 
service under 6(g)[152] of the Shipping Act.”153 Essentially, the 
Commission noted that the Agreement had the potential to 
  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. art. 6(6.1)(a). 
 148. Id. art. 6(6.1). 
 149. Id. art. 6(6.2). 
 150. Id. 
 151. P3 Agreement Clears FMC Regulatory Review, supra note 134. 
 152. Id. The Commission still refers to the anti-competitive prohibitions under the 
1984 Act, despite recodification in OSRA. See Commission Act, 46 U.S.C. § 40304 
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action under the Shipping Act). 
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circumstantially reduce services or unreasonably increase rates in 
violation of the Shipping Act, and in addressing these concerns would 
“direct[] staff to issue alternative reporting requirements . . . . specifically 
tailored to this agreement’s unique authority.”154 In implementing 
additional reporting requirements, the Commission felt it would “have 
timely and relevant information to act quickly should it be necessary.”155 
Commissioner Lidinsky’s reservations and basis for dissenting, 
however, should not be overlooked, as they are foundationally similar to 
the Chinese regulator’s rationale in barring approval of the Agreement. 
At a very basic level, the dissent highlights the perceived lack of value 
the P3 Agreement adds to the market, and to the shipper/consumer. 
Commissioner Lidinsky noted that the Agreement “[o]ffers nothing to 
the shipper, and only helps to minimize carriers’ losses[;] [o]ffers no 
significant improvement in service[;] [d]oes nothing to stabilize rates[;] 
[and] [c]ongests terminals and landside infrastructure.”156 Paralleling the 
lack of positive service the Agreement would offer to the consumer, the 
Commissioner made clear, that in his view, alliances such as the P3 
actually reduce competition because they concentrate rate setting power, 
and bar entry into the market “by new carriers who cannot compete on 
economy of scale.”157  
The Commissioner’s dissent emphasized the relevant truth regarding 
vessel sharing agreements and the carriers’ recent need for collectivism: 
the onset of 18,000 TEU vessels and a general flattening in freight rates 
demand alliances to make carriers financially competitive.158 In the 
Commissioner’s view, therefore, the P3 Agreement is a retroactive and 
corrective action by the carriers who mistakenly judged the market in 
building the largest container vessels the world has ever seen.159 To this 
end, the Commissioner felt an injunction should have been sought under 
the Shipping Act procedures, and rhetorically challenged the FMC: 
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 156. Foundation for Commissioner Lidinsky’s Dissent on the P3 Alliance Vote, 
FED. MAR. COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2014),  
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2015] Watchdogs of the World 105 
“where is its obligation to allow foreign cross traders to rectify their 
mistakes and insure profits, which could possibly harm waterborne 
commerce to and from the United States?”160 
Despite the Commissioner’s well-founded concerns and holistic 
approach to market analysis, the Commission’s ultimate approval was 
grounded in the procedural structure of the Shipping Act. The 1984 Act 
and OSRA are illustrative of the deregulatory movement of the late 
1980s and 1990s, such that the burden of garnering approval of an 
Agreement lies not on the alliance-seeking carriers but on the 
Commission itself.161 The FMC has yet to take injunctive action under 
the Shipping Act regarding a proposed agreement.162  Conceptually, it 
would be very difficult for the Commission to show that an agreement 
such as the P3 Agreement would absolutely have a detrimental effect on 
market competition, to the extent that injunctive relief, preliminary or 
permanent, could be awarded. This is to say that the FMC’s only real 
course of action in regulating a conference or vessel-sharing agreement is 
to allow the agreement to go into effect and then closely monitor it. The 
Commission may then take action under the Act, armed with economic 
data and monitoring analysis in disarming an anti-competitive 
agreement; this is information it could not possibly have access to at the 
inception of a proposed agreement, and before it has gone into effect. 
2.    Chinese Review 
  
 a. MOFCOM Rationale  
MOFCOM’s rejection of the P3 Agreement, posted on its website in 
substantial compliance with Article 30 of the Anti-monopoly code, was 
concise and unsurprisingly vague in rationale. The statement cited no 
legal authority other than Articles 27 and 30 of the Anti-monopoly Code 
and seemed to refer tangentially to some of the overarching concepts 
defined in the Transportation Regulations.163 While MOFCOM’s ultimate 
  
 160. Id.; see supra Part I.A.5.a (regarding the Shipping Act Procedures for moving 
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decision to deny approval of the Agreement rested on competition-
related factors, the more relevant, and absurdly evident criterion on 
which the decision likely turned was much simpler; the P3 Agreement 
did not include any Chinese controlled carriers, such as COSCO or China 
Shipping.164 
In reviewing the Agreement, MOFCOM mainly underwent a 
competition evaluation regarding the routes that would affect Chinese 
ports.165 Substantively, these routes included the Asia-Europe route and 
the trans-Pacific route.166 However, because the trans-Pacific route has a 
relatively high market share with a diverse control of the volume, the 
Chinese regulators looked primarily at the Europe-Asia route.167 This is 
also an assertion that should be viewed with relative skepticism, as all 
three of the P3 carriers are European-based.168 
The criteria MOFCOM purported to employ in coming to its 
conclusion, in conjunction with Article 27, included “the elements of 
relevant market shares, market power, market concentration, market 
entry, [and] the impact on consumers and other business operators.”169 In 
evaluating these principles as they related to the Agreement, MOFCOM 
ultimately “found that after the completion of the concentrated 
operations, the [P]arties will form a close association.”170 To this end, it 
appears that from a macro evaluative level, MOFCOM viewed the P3 
Agreement as a merger, possibly taking into account the merger criteria 
of China’s Transportation Regulations.171 MOFCOM felt that the general 
collective structure of the Agreement differed markedly from other 
approved agreements in the areas of “cooperation, operational procedure 
and cost sharing . . . which is obviously a close association.”172 
MOFCOM found the communal operation of the P3 to be in contrast 
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 172. Notice No. 46 of 2014, supra note 123. 
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with other approved alliances, including the Network Center that the 
Agreement would create to mutually run the operation.173 
MOFCOM also evaluated the relative market share and concentration 
that the P3 carriers would possess in the Asia-Europe route, which 
despite any cynicism regarding Chinese regulators’ evaluation, does 
present a notable concern. MOFCOM correctly noted that together the 
three carriers would control as much as 46.7 percent of the market share, 
and that consolidation of such capacity would inevitably lead to 
enhanced market control power.174 This control power, MOFCOM stated, 
would dilute competition in the market and make the entry barrier 
economically infeasible for other carriers wishing to enter the market, a 
fact that it felt made the Agreement fundamentally anti-competitive.175 
Additionally, MOFCOM also noted the glaring disparity of power 
between shippers, consignees, and carriers, a gap that would be further 
exposed by the consolidation of market power.176 Therefore, MOFCOM 
denied approval of the P3 Agreement with great finality stating that 
“[t]he parties concerned cannot prove this concentrated operation’s 
positive effects outweigh the negative impact on competition, neither can 
they prove this transaction is in accordance with the social public 
interests.”177 
 b. The Absence of Chinese Controlled Carriers from the 
  P3 Agreement 
With vessel capacity outpacing uncertain cargo demand, Chinese 
carriers, like the rest of the market are having difficulty filling vessels 
and competing on a world scale.178 What makes the P3 Agreement 
distinct from other liner conferences and vessel-sharing agreements that 
do have authority to operate in the Chinese market can be synthesized to 
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a single fact—other liner agreements have involved state-owned Chinese 
carriers.179  
In the first quarter of 2014 COSCO reported losses of $300 million as 
a result of low freight rates, with China Shipping reporting moderate 
growth.180 These losses and perceived gains are even worse when 
considering the subsidized state of these carriers, and the common 
practice of Chinese Government asset disposal to lift profitability.181 
Given the economic climate, and the performance of its controlled 
carriers, it would not make logical sense for Chinese regulators to 
approve the P3 Agreement, concurrently awarding three foreign carriers 
almost fifty percent of the market share.182  
In rationalizing this conclusion it is necessary to make a negative 
inference, looking to conference agreements that have garnered Chinese 
approval and how they differ from the P3 Agreement. One of the largest 
and most important agreements that does operate in Chinese ports is the 
Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (“TSA”). The TSA was established 
in 1989, operates in almost every major shipping market and allows for 
meeting and sharing of market information, voluntary and non-binding 
rate guidelines, and collective representation before regulatory bodies.183 
Additionally, TSA contains fifteen members; this includes COSCO and 
China Shipping, both Chinese state-owned carriers, which may in part 
explain the continued approval of the TSA, and present denial of the P3 
Agreement.184 While intellectually simple, this distinction should not be 
overlooked when combined with extenuating factors such as Chinese 
carriers’ losses, low freight rates, and a stagnant global economy. 
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CONCLUSION  
The P3 Agreement’s path to termination represents a useful lens 
through which to view the modern state of international liner conference 
regulators. The EU and U.S. are illustrative of global deregulation, with 
Europe allowing vessel-sharing agreements to move forward virtually 
unregulated, granted they control less than thirty percent of the market 
share. While the U.S. does have a concerted interest in freight rates based 
on American import volume, the gradual erosion of the U.S.-flag fleet 
makes the FMC’s liner agreement concerns one of continued monitoring 
rather than initial prevention. 
The P3 Agreement was conceptually aimed at striking at the heart of 
the world export market, China. China’s regulation system, though 
hardly transparent, seems to reflect a malleable framework capable of 
deflecting foreign influence, defending the world’s largest export market, 
and protecting its state-owned carriers. While the future of the freight 
rate market is nothing but uncertain, China appears to be the last 
remaining regulatory watchdog with the power and authority to act—an 
inevitable truth carriers will continue to confront in seeking conference 
agreement approval in the world’s most important shipping arena. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
